[Author's Note: Grateful acknowledgments are extended to Emma Jane Ohnemus, Esq., of Little Rock, for research and editorial assistance; Jane Portis Roeder of Conway, for research; the Honorable Darrell Hickman, retired Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court and currently Circuit Judge for the 17th Judicial Circuit, for candid critique, commentary, and advice; and the Honorable David Stewart of the Little Rock District Court, for a lively point/counterpoint debate on significant issues and candid commentary on early drafts of this article.]

Introduction
"That ain't cricket," my father used to say when something just didn't seem right. That saying returns to me when I deal now with cases in which a person is stopped for a traffic offense in one town, then cited into court in a town miles away, even though the town of the stop has a traffic court.

The law books state that such a filing is not defective, because municipal (now district) courts have countywide jurisdiction (except in ten counties that contain two judicial districts, jurisdiction is "limited to the district"1). I don't doubt the abilities of the judges in the "other" towns: the situation wouldn't pass Dad's gut check test.

This and a few other aspects of Arkansas's inferior court system arguably could be more efficient ­ but never have been because "that's the ways things have always been done around here." The quoted adage, a pet peeve of mine, is an often-used excuse not to improve processes or work product in the legal system.

For example, jurisdictional limitation on felonies causes cases to endure two dockets before final disposition, even if the defendant wants to plead guilty from the get-go. Also, cases involving real estate liens are statutorily precluded from disposition before judges who are fully qualified to adjudicate them.

The jurisdiction of inferior courts is not a topic that causes many readers to salivate. 2 Given the chance to write about it, I started out with vigor. My enthusiasm waned a bit when I found myself knee deep in seemingly conflicting statutes and cases decided by thin majorities.

Amendment 80, the "New Judicial Article," may have settled a century of controversy in one area and provided a foundation to shore up weaknesses in others. Or, as often is the case with new law, maybe not. But this topic is important, deserving of cornerstone status in the judiciary that Arkansas is about to build. The legal profession must take this matter seriously to ensure that whatever was to be fixed by Amendment 80 gets fixed and gets fixed right.

Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for
Exercise of Criminal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Whether a person arrested in an area served by one inferior court may rightfully be hailed into a different area's court has been debated for years. Legislation, court rules, or both pursuant to Amendment 80 may resolve this sticky question.

Some of my colleagues believe that Amendment 80 provides that district court judges must now have their jurisdiction limited to offenses occurring in the governmental unit ("district") that elects them. Some (a group that includes me) believe Amendment 80 is not so clear on this point.

What is clear is that change is at hand for the Arkansas judiciary. Motivated by the promise of non-partisan elections, the voters overwhelmingly dimpled their chads FOR Amendment 80 at the 2000 election. Now the question is, "What did we get?"

Most prominently, we got a long-heralded merger of law and equity at the circuit court level, and we got rid of party primaries for the judiciary as a whole. But we also got a cutting board for the inferior court system ­ for changes in name, jurisdiction, and venue.

Amendment 80 (effective July 1, 2001³) establishes "district courts" as "trial courts of limited jurisdiction."⁴ These courts "shall have the jurisdiction vested in" municipal, corporation, police, and justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas "at the time this Amendment takes effect [and] shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005."⁵ Moreover, "Municipal Court Judges in office [on July 1, 2001,] shall continue in office through December 31, 2004...."⁶

Resolving a potential ambiguity, the 2001 General Assembly enacted legislation providing that the district court name was effective July 1, 2001, and that district courts "shall have the jurisdiction vested in the presently established municipal courts...."⁷ Thus, jurisdiction conferred in Amendment 80 is effective in 2005. Jurisdiction conferred pursuant to Amendment 80 will be effective then also, or later, in accordance with conferring statutes or rules. By pre-existing law, other jurisdictional changes may be legislated before 2005, though in each instance, whether Amendment 80 superseded the enabling law is a valid inquiry.

Several sections of Amendment 80 merit collective scrutiny for an understanding of the issue. Before examining them, it may be helpful to establish a context, from the standpoint of what has gone before.

Historical Overview
Courts have not been of one mind as to whether an inferior court judge elected in one locality should be able to hear a criminal case arising in a different locality, especially when the locality of the offense is in a different county. Criticism has been aimed at law enforcement (for apparent forum shopping) and at municipal courts (for not dismissing cases). Prosecutors, who are ultimately responsible for where cases are filed,⁸ have been unscathed by the controversy.

No case has actually reached the issue of whether abusive forum shopping occurred. The lead dissenter, Justice Hickman, was squarely against revenue-oriented court selection. Though he never suggested that the Attorney General, as chief law enforcement officer for the State, was the appropriate official to curb allegedly improper practices, one would think that a directive from the prosecutor at the top of the food chain would have brought a halt to any actual abuses.

This issue has deep historical roots. The 1873 General Assembly gave justices of the peace (JPs) jurisdiction "coextensive with the county." First class cities of the day had "corporation courts," with jurisdiction to the county line. The intent was that if a crime was committed in the city, if the culprit were apprehended within the county, it was the city court's case; if the crime was committed outside the city, it was the JP's case.⁹ For lack of a better phrase, the county line was actually the boundary for "apprehension jurisdiction" for both courts.

Apparently intending to carry this scheme forward, the 1874 Constitution¹⁰ authorized the legislature to invest city corporation courts with jurisdiction "concurrent" with JPs. Under this grant of authority, Act 87 of 1915 enabled certain cities to create "municipal corporation courts": Judges were elected at "city elections"; jurisdiction was "coextensive with the county." In State v. Woodruff,¹¹ the court upheld the legislature's power to give a court jurisdiction beyond the "geographical limits" of its town. Such jurisdiction has remained countywide.¹²

This much-litigated precept¹³ holds that if a city judge presides over an offense committed outside the city, the "no jurisdiction" defense is not available, unless the offense occurred outside the county (in which event pre-trial dismissal is without prejudice¹⁴). Stated simplistically, the case law features repeated instances of defendants
• challenging the inferior court's venue to the inferior court and losing;
• peititioning for a writ of prohibition, within which they are unable to raise constitutional issues, and losing;
• being unable to appeal at this point because venue decisions are not final, appealable orders (and    because a trial de novo appeal to circuit may cure all defects);
• going to trial in the inferior court and losing;
• appealing to circuit and losing on trial de novo; and
• being unable to raise the inferior court venue issue because the venue issue was cured at the circuit court    level.

Also, typically, on appeal jurisdiction overtakes venue as the key issue. The nomenclature is not consistent, but perhaps that is to be expected, as the Supreme court itself has remarked that venue and jurisdiction "are often used interchangeably."¹⁵

Justice Newbern, in State v. Webb,¹⁶ used the phrase territorial jurisdiction, as distinguished from venue, which "deals with the place where a trial may be had."¹⁷ Justice Corbin, in State v. Osborn¹⁸ (which is not directly concerned with municipal court issues) used the phrase local jurisdiction, which "deals ...with where the offense is to be tried."¹⁹

Territorial jurisdiction is to a court what in personam jurisdiction is to a defendant. The concept is that the person was in the territory when the deed was done. For a century this jurisdiction has been co-terminal with the county line where criminal subject matter jurisdiction of municipal courts is concerned. Frankly, the law seems to be that if a trial judge calls it venue, the case is transferred; if she calls it jurisdiction (without a qualifier), the case is dismissed (though without prejudice). The popular, if informal, notion is that when intra-county movement of a case occurs, venue is involved, but if inter-county movement occurs, then jurisdiction is involved.²⁰

The key characteristic of venue is that it "relates to practice and procedure and may be waived."²¹ As simple as that seems, several cases upholding countywide jurisdiction on the basis that intra-county case-shifting was a venue matter were 4-3 decisions, with vigorous dissent. The theme of the dissent has been that when a law enforcement agent chooses a court other than the one most logically associated with the point of arrest, it looks like forum-shopping.²²

This lament could be rectified by a venue statute or court rule, mandating transfer to required geographically logical or convenient venues on timely objection, or by a directive from the Attorney General, directing that district court cases be prosecuted in specified courts, based on geographical logic or convenience. Especially where traffic cases are concerned, this would likely have satisfied the dissenters, as traffic cases tend to produce revenue, the motive oft-cited for why a traffic defendant stopped in one town wound up in court in a town several miles distant.²³

As to non-traffic cases, a similar rule or directive governing venue might tolerate prosecutorial flexibility for cases, such as those involving a particular expertise or those in which obvious economies are served, though not to the detriment of the defendants. If legislation implementing Amendment 80 eliminates overlapping territorial jurisdiction of all district courts, then this entire area of discussion may be moot in 2005. But it wouldn't hurt to have a better rule to govern between now and then.

Justice Hickman went so far as to say that when a judge elected by the voters of one city presided over a crime occurring outside that city, a jurisdictional issue that could be raised sua sponte on appeal was presented, rather than a venue issue that faded in the circuit court appeal process. Believing judges should not hear cases arising outside the localities electing them, he wanted to overrule Woodruff.

Aside from practical problems in re-filing a dismissed case,²⁵ as opposed to transferring a non-dismissed case, arguably, had the dissent carried the day, it would have been but a Pyrrhic victory for defendants, since the same charges would re-surface in a court down the road. However, the dissent garnered popular support, as reflected by Acts 1118 and 1574 of 1999, requiring countywide election of municipal judges, except in counties with a population of over 100,000.²⁶

The "system" long ago should have acted on this issue. If it is a venue matter ­ involving practice and procedure ­ the executive or judicial branch could have adopted a governing rule. If it is a jurisdictional matter ­ involving a judge's right to exercise authority²⁷ ­ the legislative branch could have enacted a more efficient statutory arrangement. Under Amendment 80, the legislature continues to have sole authority to establish territorial jurisdiction in criminal matters; the Supreme Court arguably has concurrent authority to govern venue.

In the second part of this article (next issue of the magazine), we will look at the specific provisions of Amendment 80 that bear on this aspect of the jurisdictional issue, as well as consider other jurisdictional issues that may shape the future of Arkansas's newest court of first resort. And, while this may seem a rather mundane issue to lawyers whose practice does not bring them frequently into the trenches of district court, I urge the entire bar to take an interest. A century of controversial case law sends us the message that we can do better. The passage of Amendment 80 gives us the opportunity to do so. Let's not pass up that opportunity.

Footnotes
1 Ark. Code Ann. §16-17-206(b)(Repl. 1994) provides that the "jurisdiction of a municipal court shall be    coextensive with the county in which it is situated, except in counties having two (2) judicial districts, the    jurisdiction shall be limited to the district in which the court is situated." Arkansas counties that are   divided into two judicial districts are Sebastian (see Ark. Const. Art. 13, §5; Ark. Code. Ann. §16-13-    2002 (Repl. 1994)); Prairie (see Ark. Code. Ann §§16-16-719 & 13-2502 (Repl. 1994)); Clay,   Craighead, and Mississippi (see Ark. Code. Ann. §16-13-1002 (Repl. 1994)); Lawrence (see Ark.   Code Ann. §16-13-1102 (Repl. 1994)); Franklin (see Ark. Code Ann. §16-13-1302 (Repl. 1994));   Arkansas (see Ark. Code Ann. §16-13 1902 (Repl. 1994)); Logan and Yell (see Ark. Code Ann   §16-  13-2302 (Repl. 1994)). Subsequent references to "countywide" means "district-wide" where these   counties are concerned. See also Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-17 119(c) (Repl. 1994) (governing bodies of   cities in counties with over 25,000 residents may add municipal court divisions. "each of which shall have   jurisdiction coextensive with the county"), §16-17-704(Supp 1999)(in civil cases municipal courts have   original jurisdiction "coextensive with the county wherein the court is situated), 16-17-217 & 16-19-401   (Repl. 1994) (in townships having a municipal court, justices of the peace "shall have original jurisdiction   coextensive with the county"). The same phrase, "coextensive with the county," is used to describe the   jurisdiction of mayor's, city, and police courts, but with the qualification that this jurisdiction is as to   "crimes and offenses committed within the limits of the city." See, e.g. Ark. Code Ann. §§16-18-112   (Repl. 1994), 14-44-108 & 14-45-106 (Repl. 1998).
2 Readers who do find this issue compelling are encouraged to watch for a greatly expanded treatment of    this topic in an upcoming issue of the UALR Law Review.
3 Ark. Const., Amend. 80, §21.
4 Id. §7(A).
5 Id. §19(B)(2).
6 Id. §19(A)(3).
7 Act 1693 of 2001.
8 Former Article 7, Section 24 of the 1874 Constitution provided that "The qualified electors of each    circuit shall elect a prosecuting attorney . . . ." Prosecuting attorney is defined as "any person legally    elected, appointed, or otherwise designated or charged . . . with the duty of prosecuting persons    accused of crimes or traffic offenses." It "includes, but is not limited to: (i) a prosecuting attorney and any    of his deputies or assistants; and (ii) a city attorney and any of his deputies or assistants." Ark. R. Cr. P.    1.6(b)(ii). Under Ark. Code Ann. §16-21-103 (Repl. 1994), "Each prosecuting attorney shall    commence and prosecute all criminal actions in which the state or any county in his district may be    concerned." As to cities, prosecuting attorneys may designate city attorneys to prosecute in municipal    courts state misdemeanors occurring in the city. Ark. Code Ann. §16-21-115 (Repl. 1994).
9 See State v. Woodruff, 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W. 813 (1915).
10 Art. 7, §43.
11 120 Ark. 406, 414, 179 S.W. 813 (1915).
12 See Note 1, supra.
13 Noteworthy cases include State v. Langstaff, 231 Ark. 736, 332 S.W.2d 614 (1960) (speeder's    venue change from Hamburg Municipal Court to Egypt JP Court upheld on the basis that an order    granting or denying a change of venue is not appealable); Peel v. Kelley, 268 Ark. 90, 594 S.W.2d 11    (1980) (upholding inter-county venue in small claims, noting municipal courts "have no necessary    connection with county lines"); Pulaski County Municipal Court v. Scott, 272 Ark. 115, 612 S.W.2d    297 (1981) (county is "municipal corporation" for purposes of having municipal court); Horn v. State,    282 Ark. 75, 665 S.W.2d 880 (1984) (law doesn't require defendant be charged in court nearest    arrest, equal protection issue ­ "inability of county residents to vote for a municipal judge who has    countywide authority" not reached); City Court of Pea Ridge v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399    (1987) (by statute, where state offense was charged, venue motion divests city court of jurisdiction);    City of Springdale v. Jones, 295 Ark. 129, 747 S.W.2d 98 (1988) (Springdale Municipal Court, in    Washington County, had no jurisdiction over offense occurring in Benton County segment of Springdale,    even though city voters from both counties elected judge); Pschier v. State, 297 Ark. 206, 760 S.W.2d    858 (1988) (arrest "east of Elkins" prosecuted in West Fork Municipal Court, jurisdiction and venue    arguments lost justiciability in circuit court trial de novo); Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 760 S.W.2d    852 (1988) (fair trial with proper venue in circuit court mooted fairness issue of Springdale resident's    being arrested in Springdale's Washington County part and tried in Elkins Municipal Court over venue    objection,); Sexson v. Municipal Court of Springdale, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993) (Ark.    Code Ann. §16-17-206(b)(2) (Supp. 1991), enlarging municipal courts' jurisdictions to include parts of    cities that extend into other counties, held unconstitutional); State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d    259 (1996) (equal protection claim rendered moot at circuit court level in case of seven defendants    arrested in areas of Benton County, other than Rogers or Bentonville, but hailed into those cities'    municipal courts).
14 State v. Osborn, 345 Ark. 196, 203, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001).
15 Id.
16 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259 (1996).
17 Id. 323 Ark. at 85.
18 345 Ark. 196, 199, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001).
19 "Ordinarily, venue refers to the geographic area, like a county, where an action is brought to trial.    ...[J]urisdiction is generally thought of as the power of a court to decide cases, and it presupposes    control over the subject matter and the parties. ...One type of jurisdiction is known as local jurisdiction    [which] 'deals only with where the offense is to be tried, not with whether the state lacks the basic    authority to apply its criminal law to the events in question'." Id., citing LaFave, Criminal Procedure    §16.1(a), at 461 (2d ed. 1999). In my opinion, Justice Corbin virtually equates local jurisdiction with    venue, though he wrote that the Osborn facts presented "an issue of local jurisdiction, not venue." Id.
20 A statute that speaks of moving a case between municipal courts in the same county refers to change    of venue. Ark. Code Ann. §16 17-116 (Repl. 1994). Unfortunately, this is the only statute that speaks    to the issue of changing venue in district court cases, and it provides that a defendant must show almost    overt prejudice in order to be entitled to a venue change. Another statute speaks of municipal judges'    exchanging jurisdiction "in their respective city and county districts." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-102    (Repl. 1994). This statute provides a loose standard by which district judges may shift their dockets    among each other without regard to where cases arose or whether the presiding judge was elected from    the area in which the offense was committed. The latter's broad wording accommodates inter- and    intra-county relocation of hearings, as well as the inter- or intra-county travel by judges to sit for each    other. I've used it to send a case to a neighboring county and to have another judge travel to Little Rock    to sit for me.
21 Griffin, supra Note 13, 297 Ark. at 210 (Glaze, J., concurring).
22 Funds collected as a result of municipal court criminal proceedings are deposited into the treasury of    the city in which the court is located and are available for "general municipal purposes." See Ark. Code    Ann. §16-17-119 (Repl. 1994). Suggestions of monetary motive are less than veiled in Justice    Hickman's dissents in Griffin, Pschier, and Scott, supra. Note 13.
23 In Griffin, supra. Note 13, 297 Ark. at 215, Judge Hickman pondered why a deputy sheriff who    arrested Griffin in Springdale, "a city of 25,556," would transport him to Elkins, "a town of 673" ­    "because the justice was better there? Š Perhaps he wanted to help Elkins out in its revenue raising    efforts. In fiscal year 1988, Elkins collected $46,353.00 in fines. Perhaps the sheriff's office favors    Elkins, or maybe it is just a matter of spreading business around."
24 Id., 297 Ark at 215-16: "The municipal courts of Elkins and West Fork have no jurisdiction over    misdemeanors committed outside their city limits. ...The court can ignore the problem and hope a    constitutional amendment will be passed or that these cases won't persist.... [A]nytime a policeman    can decide which judge will determine the fate of the defendant, there is an open invitation to    corruption." (Emphasis added.)
25 In a traffic matter, assuming the arresting officer had jurisdiction to issue the citation, a dismissal without    prejudice in district court would involve either creating a file in the dismissing court, retaining a certified    copy of the original citation, and returning the original citation to the issuing agency or to the local    prosecuting authority for transfer to the prosecuting authority in the appropriate jurisdiction, or, if the    dismissing court retained the citation without accommodation to the prosecuting authority, the drafting of    an affidavit for an arrest warrant for processing in the appropriate jurisdiction, issuance and service of    the warrant, etc.
26 Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-71-120 & 130 (Supp. 1999). These bills came up on rather short notice in the    1999 General Assembly, prompting an inquiry to the sponsors, who candidly stated that certain    residents of smaller counties who lived outside the voting parameters of certain municipal judges in their    counties believed they should have the right to vote on the municipal judge before whom they either    might have to appear. That the solution employed was to expand the universe of municipal judge    electors, rather than mandate that law enforcement file cases in geographically logical venues is ironic.    The irony is highlighted by federal court precedent, approving circuit court "electoral sub-districts," in    which minority voters, constituting a majority of residents, elect judges who then expressly have    territorial jurisdiction exceeding the geography of the area that elects them See, e.g., Hunt v. State, U.S.    D.C (E.D. Ark.) No. PB-C-89-406 (Nov. 7, 1991), explained in Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543,    547-48, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), and Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 190-93, 919 S.W.2d 943    (1996). See also Holt Civil Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (under Alabama    law allowing municipal court jurisdiction three miles beyond city limits, residents of unincorporated    community had no constitutional right to participate in political processes of city simply because they    were subject to its police and sanitary regulations).
27 See Note 27, infra.
28 The term geographical area (§16(D)) is, if nothing else, a far less definitive term than analogous nouns    of common usage (city, township, county, district, etc.). It seems intended to provide flexibility in    areas where the case law has disallowed reasoned solutions to practical problems ­ such as where a city    is located on a county line ­ without abrogating the provision that there be at least one court per county.    It will be interesting to see how that term develops. While I have omitted any significant discussion of this    section in the text, suffice it to say that, somehow, this section factors into the reasoning of those who    hold that Amendment 80 repealed countywide jurisdiction of municipal courts.
29 For those who argue that Amendment 80 repealed countywide jurisdiction, the phrase majority of    electors within the district they serve triggers a thought pattern envisioning a boundary within which all    voters (in the judge's election) live and within which a crime must occur for that judge to have jurisdiction    over the perpetrator. However, I believe this section's sole significance lies in its changing the electoral    quantum, from plurality to majority, for district court judges.
30 Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states that the word jurisdiction "is a term of large and    comprehensive import" and provides over a page of definitions for the word and for phrases    encompassing the word. Perhaps the most accurate nuclear definition, however, is "the legal right by    which judges exercise their authority." Although it may be error to do so, I avoid extensive definition of    this basic term, assuming the reader to know and understand the basic distinctions among in personam,    in rem, and subject matter jurisdiction.
31 See id.
32 Section 10 provides that the legislature is to establish districts and the appropriate number of judges for    each, districts to be composed of "contiguous territories." This, read with Section 7(D) ("A District    Judge may serve in one or more counties") vis-à-vis Jones, supra. Note 13, and Sexson, supra. Note    13, addresses the need in cities on county lines.
33 Ark. Code Ann. §14-56-413 (Repl. 1998).
34 See Note 26, supra.
35 Judge Stewart graciously agreed to be quoted in this article. Quotes attributed to him are from private    correspondence in August 2001.
36 Webb, supra Note 13, 323 Ark. at 87 (Hickman, dissenting).
37 E.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-2-317 (venue for some persons committed to DHS custody "may be in"    Pulaski Probate, Ninth Division"; for some who've been conditionally released, "shall be in" probate    court of the county where the person currently resides); 16-60-109 (contract actions against nonresident    may be in county of plaintiff's residence when claim arose); 16-60-202 (no venue change in civil actions    unless necessary for impartial trial); 23-32-1505 ("foreign investor companies" may sue and be sued in    county of residence of any party to the suit; where land is involved, venue shall be in the county where    land is located); 28-40-102 (venue for probate and administration of will); 28-65-202 (venue for    appointment of guardian); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(general venue statute for all civil actions in United States    District Court); 1965 (venue in RICO cases); 47 U.S.C. § 227(F)(4) (venue for states to file civil    actions against unlawful telephone solicitors). This list is far from complete. Searches for venue on    electronic legal research servers produce dozens of statutes that contain the word.
38 E.g., F.R. Cr. P. 18: "Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall    be had in a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within the    district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses and the prompt    administration of justice." A search of Arkansas court rules for venue reflects only seven that contain the    word: A.R. Cr. P. 21.3 (two or more offenses are "related" if, inter alia, "within the jurisdiction and    venue" of same court); 24.8 (when pleading to offenses committed in other jurisdictions, defendant    requesting transfer of charges is deemed to waive "venue as to an offense committed in another    governmental unit of the state"); A.R. Inf. Ct. 2 ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or affect    the jurisdiction of the inferior courts Šor the venue of actions therein"); A.R. Civ. P. 8, 12, & 82; and    Procedures of the Ct. Reg. Prof. Conduct §5 (venue for attorney disbarment proceedings).
39 Ark. Const., Amend. 80, §7(A).
40 Ark. Const., Amend. 64; Ark. Code Ann. 16-17-704 (1999 Supp.).
41 Ark. Const., Amend. 80, §7(B).
42 The process for the Supreme Court's promulgation of a rule is, as best I can tell, not reduced to a    formulaic process. Thus, any suggestion I might make regarding how to employ it would be speculative.    There are committees in place as to most sets of rules, and membership of those committees is a matter    of public record.
43 See State v. Lester, 343 Ark. 662, 38 S.W.3d 318 (2001); Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783    S.W.2d 47 (1990).
44 Ark. Const., Amend. 80, §7(B).
45 See McGrew v. State, 338 Ark. 30, 991 S.W.2d 588 (1999); McArthur v. Pulaski County Circuit    Court, 253 Ark. 501, 504 488 S.W.2d 5 (1972).
46 See State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 900 S.W. 2d 175 (1995).